Financiamiento de campañas y cabildeo: avances y retos en el estudio de grupos de interés

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Diego Solís Delgadillo
Josafat Cortez Salinas

Resumen

Este artículo analiza los estudios de grupos de interés y hace una revisión de los hallazgos empíricos y los retos metodológicos de dos áreas de la literatura: 1) el efecto de las contribuciones a campañas políticas sobre las decisiones públicas y 2) la influencia del cabildeo sobre las votaciones legislativas. El documento señala las limitaciones metodológicas de la literatura de grupos de interés e identifica obstáculos que evitan el desarrollo de este campo de estudio fuera de los Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea.

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Cómo citar
Solís Delgadillo, D., & Cortez Salinas, J. (2022). Financiamiento de campañas y cabildeo: avances y retos en el estudio de grupos de interés. Revista Mexicana De Ciencias Políticas Y Sociales, 67(246). https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2022.246.77098

Citas en Dimensions Service

Biografía del autor/a

Diego Solís Delgadillo, El Colegio de San Luis A.C.

Investigador Posdoctoral en El Colegio de San Luis A.C.

Doctor en Ciencia Política (FLACSO México)

Josafat Cortez Salinas, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Profesor Investigador en la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

Doctor en Ciencia Política (FLACSO México)

Citas

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