Campaign Financing and Lobbying: Breakthroughs and Challenges in the Study of Interest Groups
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Abstract
This article analyzes interest group studies and examines the empirical findings and methodological challenges of two literature areas: 1) the effect of contributions to political campaigns on public decisions and 2) the influence of lobbying on legislative votes. The document points out the methodological limitations of interest group studies and identifies obstacles that prevent the development of this field of study outside the United States and the European Union.
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