Reforming the Constitution: the Political Economy of the Pacto por México

Abstract

Since before the 2000 transition to democracy, the need for a democratic governability agreement in Mexico was considered a major challenge. The incapacity of the 12-year pan administration to fulfill their reformist agenda lead many to conclude that an institutional reform to strengthen the President was needed. In this sense, the Pacto por México was a surprise. It made innovations in the mechanisms of political agreement enabling the approval of seven constitutional reforms that had been decisively rejected during the pan administrations, even by the pri, which now headed the government. This article explores the negotiation of the Pacto and the nature of the approved reforms. It is argued that the Pacto was the result of some basic agreement among most of the political elite on what reforms were needed, and the strategy of the two main opposition parties to impose on the negotiation a part of their agenda. It is also contended that in order to maintain partisan discipline, which allowed to approve the reforms in a very short time, some sort of “legalized” corruption was needed –such as payments to legislators. Finally, we conclude that despite  the reformist optimism with which Peña Nieto’s administration began, the reforms have failed to promote economic growth as expected, both because of the collapse in the price of the crude oil , and the lack of experience and extensive corruption of the administration.