Concepts of Determinism and Free Will in Archaeology

Abstract

Concepts of determinism and free will are used freely by archaeologists in both implicit and explicit contexts. In most cases, these terms are at best vaguely defined and the philosophical literature on the subject is seldom referenced. This literature points to an extensive debate concerning the existence of determinism and free will that has yet to be resolved. The varied uses of the terms in philosophy suggest a need for a critical reassessment of their use in archaeology. Archaeological interest in free will has recently gained momentum with the emphasis on the agency by postprocessualists who in some cases generally imply that agency equals the ability to have free will. Not only is the implicit use of free will assumptive, it also engenders problematic ideological dilemmas. Furthermore, speculative resolution of the debate is not central to how archaeologists model the dynamics of human choice and action. In this paper, I examine the debate as it exists in archaeology today with a critical eye towards its explicit use in some postprocessualist thought. I demonstrate the futility of the continuation of the debate and the dilemmas it engenders when used in the professional arena.