Political Economy of the Global Bank-State Relationship: Mexico

Abstract

This article addresses the relationship between global banking and the Mexican state from an international political economy perspective. In this respect, the text explores some theories and concepts that account for the power structures that are constituted at the international level and how these reconfigure the practices and behavior of the state in favor of the particular interests of certain financial agents. Specifically, from the notion of the competition state. Here it is argued, first, that the regime of capital accumulation in favor of the banks running in Mexico is neither originated nor reproduced exclusively by endogenous factors but is a process that responds to transnational logics and interests. Secondly, it is argued that the Mexican banking system has been reoriented to favor particular foreign interests by playing a specific role in the strategies of global banks. This has come at the cost of not fulfilling its social and economic function for the nation in which its participants operate.