Presidential Power, Vetoes, and Public Policy: a Comparative Study between Brazil and the United States

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Publié-e : aoû 28, 2019
DOI : https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2019.237.65206

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Matheus Lucas Hebling
University of Campinas
Flávio Contrera
Federal University of São Carlos

Résumé

Much of the literature on Presidentialism focuses on the argument that bipartisan presidential systems are better able to avoid an intense Executive-Legislative relation by facilitating the formation of coalitions in Congress and the partisan ideological identification. From a comparative perspective, this study aims to identify and discuss the powers of the presidents of the United States and Brazil in promoting their actions as producers of public policy and checking the degree of conflict in the production of such policies by checking legislative vetoes. In addition, we analyze the success rate of draft laws of welfare policies voted in the lower house of the two countries and supported by their respective presidents. Our time frame covers a period of 16 years in each country (from 1995 to 2010 in Brazil and in the United States from 1993 to 2008), with eight years of more liberal administrations and eight years of more conservative governments in each country. The hypothesis is that there is no significant difference regarding the conflict and production of public policies in two-party or multi-party systems and that success rates are similar. The data were analyzed using multivariate regressions and will undergo a qualitative treatment for a deeper understanding.

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Hebling, M. L., & Contrera, F. (2019). Presidential Power, Vetoes, and Public Policy: a Comparative Study between Brazil and the United States. Revista Mexicana De Ciencias Políticas Y Sociales, 64(237). https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2019.237.65206

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Bibliographies de l'auteur-e

Matheus Lucas Hebling, University of Campinas

Department of Political Science, Ph.D. Candidate

Flávio Contrera, Federal University of São Carlos

Department of Social Sciences, Post-Doctoral Researcher

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