Reichenbach: el empirismo se quedó sin inducción

Abstract

For a true empiricist, knowledge can only be derived from experience. If an empiricist we- re to propose induction as a method for apprehending, then the experience “excess” of radical empiricism would be forsaken. This because induction is a non-analytic method that can- not be considered as a yield of sense experience, and if not based on experience, it would then be incorrect to advocate experience as the sole source of knowledge. Thus the dilemma of the radical empiricist: if the principie of induction is acknowledged, radical empiricism is abjured; if radical empiricism is upheld, then the principle of induction needs be abandoned. Reichenbach argued that by forsaking induction the empiricist must then accept prediction as impossible, thereby limiting knowledge and enticing agnosticism. In any case, Reichenbach did not acquiesce to Hume's “quietism”. Hume’s solution was not correct, it was psychological; wherefore the question of induction remained unaffected. Thus Reichenbach propounded to accept Hume’s incorrect solution at that, and in any case inquire whether induction was a good or a bad habit. Reichenbach’s proposal was to use induction to valídate theories, that is, he linked induction to the realm of validation. The author contends that this other solution is still psychological, and that the logical problem is being eluded in order not to relinquish induction.