O behaviorismo de um ponto de vista Kohlberguiano: algumas reflexões consideracões

Abstract

In addition to being an experimental (scientific) analysis of behavior, Skinner's behaviorism is also the philosophy of that science, and bence it takes on a set of philosophical assumptions related to justice and morality. Although rejecting some violent, unjustified, and passionate criticisms addressed to Skinner's person and views on moral questions, this paper assumes explicitly the defense of  Kohlberg's theory of  moral development when compared with Skinner's ideas and perspectives. I argue that 1) Skinner's opposition to punishment is based on pragmatic, not on moral considerations; 2) be maintains too complacent an idea morality; 3) be tends to overlook the idea of moral obligation; 4) be falls into the naturalistic fallacy; 5) he gives too great an emphasis to utilitarian considerations to the detriment of justice as a moral principle; 6) his views on Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning may run the risk of being at variance with what they are supposed to be; and, 7) Skinner tends to misunderstand Kohlberg's claim that "he who knows the good chooses the good".