ON THE NEED FOR FORWARD-LOOKING POLICYMAKING: AN ECUADORIAN CASE
Contenido principal del artículo
Resumen
ABSTRACT
While allowing the refiling of taxes in the case of legitimate mistakes is reasonable, there is empirical evidence showing that the unlimited ability to refile may incentivize evasion. However, theoretical models examining limiting unlimited refilings are nonexistent. Therefore, this paper develops a model to study the role of allowing an unlimited number of tax refilings on the behavior of taxpayers that received tax notifications because they under-reported taxes, as it was seen in the case of Ecuador between 2010 and 2012. Among other things, the key finding of the examination is that, if taxpayers are allowed to refile as many times as they want, the best decision for selfish taxpayers is to evade taxes. Contributing to the tax compliance literature but from a broader perspective as well, this paper demonstrates the importance of considering behavior through careful theoretical analysis before implementing new tax policies.
SOBRE LA NECESIDAD DE FORMULAR POLÍTICAS PREVISORAMENTE: UN CASO ECUATORIANO
RESUMEN
Si bien es razonable permitir declaraciones sustitutivas de impuestos en caso de errores legítimos, hay evidencia empírica que demuestra que la capacidad ilimitada de hacerlas puede incentivar la evasión. Sin embargo, no existen modelos teóricos que examinen la limitación de las declaraciones sustitutivas ilimitadas. Entonces, este artículo desarrolla un modelo para estudiar el papel de permitir declaraciones sustitutivas de impuestos ilimitadamente sobre el comportamiento de contribuyentes que recibieron notificaciones porque sub-declararon impuestos, como fue el caso en Ecuador entre 2010 y 2012. Entre otros, el hallazgo clave de la investigación es que, si se les permite realizar declaraciones sustitutivas tantas veces como quieran, la mejor decisión para las(os) contribuyentes egoístas es evadir impuestos. Contribuyendo a la literatura sobre el cumplimiento tributario, pero también desde una perspectiva más amplia, este artículo demuestra la importancia de considerar el comportamiento a través de un análisis teórico cuidadoso antes de implementar nuevas políticas tributarias.
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