EFECTOS DE LA REPUTACIÓN DEL BANCO CENTRAL DE COLOMBIA SOBRE LA TASA DE INTERÉS
Contenido principal del artículo
Resumen
Analizamos los efectos de la reputación y de la comunicación del Banco Central de Colombia en los errores de pronóstico de la tasa de interés de la política monetaria. Implementamos una metodología que calcula el error de pronóstico por medio de expectativas del mercado financiero para horizontes de 1, 3, 6, 9 y 12 meses. Luego construimos diferentes indicadores de comunicación del Banco Central para estimar sus efectos sobre los errores de pronóstico. Las estimaciones econométricas permitieron identificar que la reputación ayuda a disminuir los errores de pronóstico, tanto a corto como a largo plazo. Las noticias de política monetaria reducen los errores para los horizontes de 1, 3, 6 y 9 meses. Por último, encontramos que la claridad de la comunicación y la cantidad de palabras en las minutas sólo importa a 1 y 3 meses. La principal recomendación de política apunta a consolidar la reputación de política monetaria y mejorar los canales de comunicación con el fin de influir con mayor fuerza en las expectativas de largo plazo.
EFFECTS OF COLOMBIA’S CENTRAL BANK REPUTATION ON FORECAST ERRORS OF THE INTEREST RATE
ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the effects of Colombia’s central bank reputation and communication on the forecast errors of the monetary policy interest rate. A methodology is implemented that consists of calculating the forecast error through financial market expectations for horizons of 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months. Subsequently, different communication indicators of the Central Bank are built to estimate their effects on forecast errors. The econometric estimates allowed us to identify that reputation helps to reduce forecast errors, both in the short and long term. On the other hand, the monetary policy news reduces the errors for the horizons of 1, 3, 6 and 9 months. Finally, it was found that the clarity of the communication only matters at 1 and 3 months. The main policy recommendation is to consolidate the reputation of monetary policy and improve communication channels in order to influence long-term expectations more strongly.
Detalles del artículo
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