https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/issue/feed 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Gerardo de la Fuente Lora colefilos@gmail.com Open Journal Systems El Anuario de Filolosofía esta integrado trabajos de calidad de profesores del Colegio de Filosofía que han estado desarrollando investigaciones sobre problemas de ética, estética, epistemología, ontología y filosofía de la cultura. Los artículos de las diferentes secciones se caracterizan por centrarse en problemas teóricos o prácticos vigentes en la actualidad. Con ello se muestra la pertinencia de la reflexión filosófica para hablar y discutir acerca de los problemas del mundo contemporáneo. https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31535 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Mauricio Ávila Barba renrivse@hotmail.com

El asunto en debate es determinar la pertinencia —y entiéndase por esto, las virtudes o los inconvenientes— de armonizar el trabajo historiográfico con la reflexión propiamente filosófica.

Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31536 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Ariela Battán Horenstein renrivse@hotmail.com

In this paper I try to reflect on a forgotten problem among the specialists in Cartesian philosophy. Is it possible to find a phenomenological realm in Cartesian thought in which the problem of sensory perception has new validity and justification judgments? This implies the possibility of valuing the sensory knowledge in a different context, distinct from that of the Cartesian dualism, in which the sensory knowledge is put under suspicion. In order to show that this phenomenological realm exists and that it is propounded by Descartes in the Sixth Meditation, it is first necessary to think about the possibility of re-introducing the substantial interaction between mind and body in a new epistemological explanation framework. The first task is to give up the metaphysical framework which provides the clear and distinct conceptual notion of God, mind, substance, and the accounts used by the mechanical physics to explain the res extensa. The main purpose is to leave the dualist way of understanding and treatment of mind-body interaction, and to pay attention to the phenomenological realm. When Descartes tries to answer the question: what is feeling? the phenomenological realm appears in the Sixth Meditation. To show how this phenomenological realm functions as a justification and validity judgment, I will consider first the definition of the union between mind and body in order to state the union as theoretical framework. Second, I will analyse the phenomenon of pain with the aim of seeing the different ways of treatments of pain as an example of phenomenal experience in the mind-body distinction context, and in the mind-body union context. Finally, I shall propound the central assumptions which constitute the namely “Cartesian science of mind-body union”.

Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31538 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Laura Benítez renrivse@hotmail.com

In this paper my depart point is the reconstruction of Cartesian physics that Edward Slowik presents in his book: “Cartesian Space Time” (2002). My aim is to analyze some questions that Slowik proposes with respect to the movement and the problems that it entails for the Cartesian version of physics. I concentrate myself in two questions that Newton considers without solution within Cartesian natural philosophy and that Edward Slowick intend to solve following some proposals and theoretical frameworks of contemporary physics. I will consider concretely the problem of relative movement and the movement in the plenum. I want to mention that the proposal of Slowik is much more comprehensive because he wants to give us a consistent version of Cartesian physics; nonetheless I think that the problems I deal with are enough representative of the importance of Cartesian physics for the history of modern science.

Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31539 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Sébastien Charles renrivse@hotmail.com

Se presenta habitualmente al Siglo de las Luces en ruptura con el cartesianismo del cual se habría deslindado para adoptar el empirismo de Locke. En su concepción general, esta tesis no es falsa, pero ciertamente se ve sobrepasada puesto que varias problemáticas propias del racionalismo clásico se mantendrán durante el siglo XVIII. Para validar esta tesis de un Siglo de las Luces heredero en parte de los problemas filosóficos cartesianos, tomaré el ejemplo del solipsismo, que no cesó de obsesionar a los mejores espíritus de las Luces, de Voltaire a Rousseau, pasando por Condillac, Diderot, D’Alembert, Turgot, D’Holbach o incluso Helvétius. Por regla general, se trata para ellos de demostrar que este idealismo extremo es a la vez insostenible e irrefutable. Es por lo que, sobre esta cuestión, es a menudo la broma y el humor los que parecen conducirla, incluso si se percibe claramente que las posturas filosóficas propias del solipsismo son más serias de lo que se les quiere reconocer. Desearía, entonces, brevemente regresar al problema solipsista en la época clásica, a fin de ver lo que puede enseñarnos de novedoso sobre el desarrollo del cartesianismo en el Siglo de las Luces.

Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31540 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 José Marcos de Teresa renrivse@hotmail.com

Too often it is supposed that Descartes tried to cut all links with the philosophical tradition, and that his main project was to develop a presupositionless philosophy. On the other hand, following the example set by Étienne Gilson great (and to a point, successful) efforts have been, and continue to be, devoted to clarify the many Scholastic debts that Descartes incurred in; and Cicero is another well-known influence on him. However and surprisingly, the possible classical Greek root of cartesianism (in particular that from Plato and Aristotle) has scarcely attracted the attention of the specialists. A brief exam shows that these links not only exist, but have to do with essential tenets and instruments of Descartes’ philosophy, like the doctrine of method. Therefore, it might well be necessary to take the (heretofore ignored) classical context of Descartes’ philosophy, as determinant to any reasonable interpretation of the latter. In fact, Descartes shouldn’t be seen only as a great philosopher by himself, as well as the founder of Modern Philosophy. He deserves to be taken as a Renaissance thinker--perhaps the last and the greatest of the humanists.

Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31541 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Syliane Malinowski-Charles renrivse@hotmail.com

This paper analyses the epistemological status of the knowledge of one’s soul presented by Descartes, and examines some criticisms made to it by some followers such as Malebranche. In particular, a study of Descartes’ vocabulary shows a tendency to take this intuition as a form of sense experience. This paper thus ponders whether the intuition we have of our own existence in Descartes is not to be understood as a form of inner sense rather than as a rational intuition, and it raises a new sort of objection to the cogito in the style of Arnauld’s circle

Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31542 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Jean-Paul Margot renrivse@hotmail.com

Contrary to Hegel, Descartes didn’t begin a “new period”, in which the thought order and command the world; he is inside the nominalistic crisis. For this reason, we should question the Hegelian interpretation, where Descartes began the history of the modern metaphysic; the history of a continuo

2012-04-26T00:00:00-05:00 Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31546 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Nora María Matamoros Franco renrivse@hotmail.com

This paper focus in defining the Cartesian thought through the principal ideas of the new philosophy of Campanella.

Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31548 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Zuraya Monroy Nasr renrivse@hotmail.com

Much has been written on Cartesian dualism and its consequences. In contrast, very little has been said on the notion of time. Descartes himself scarcely mentioned it. In this paper I intend to reconstruct the Cartesian conception of time in the context of its metaphysical foundations. Time is a physical notion, immersed in several senses in Cartesian metaphysics. On the one hand, the metaphysical roots of time are buried in the notion of creation or continuous preservation. Their main role is to explain the conservation of the quantity of motion expressed in the Cartesian physical laws. For the French philosopher, how the extended substance in motion is permanently preserved must be explained. Simultaneously, in the plenum, particular bodies in motion transmit and lose motion continuously. On the other hand, it is relevant to make clear if Descartes’ conception on time and duration depend on motion or, on the contrary, if time is independent of motion. For this purpose, I propose that it is necessary to stick to a radical interpretation of Cartesian metaphysical dualism in order to understand why: 1) in ontological terms, duration and motion are inseparable attributes of extended things and 2) in epistemic terms, time is a mode of human thought meant to know the duration of material things, with the inclusion of parameters and conventions.

Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31550 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Juan Carlos Moreno Romo renrivse@hotmail.com

El texto explora la actualidad del pensamiento y el ejemplo cartesianos confrontándolos principalmente con la hermenéutica, en su calidad de moda y ortodoxia filosófica hoy relativamente dominante en nuestras instituciones. La figura de Descartes es invocada aquí también en su calidad de puente, o de eslabón perdido entre la cultura mediterránea y la nórdica, o entre la católica y la protestante, lo mismo que entre la tradición y la modernidad. Al volvernos a plantear el problema de la “vía latina”, el presente artículo es también a su manera una reflexión sobre el problema de la filosofía hispánica o ibero (y no “latino”) americana.

Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31552 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Carmen Silva renrivse@hotmail.com

This essay’s aim is to highlight the cartesian particularity and it’s revolutionary proposal of studying the human passions as a scientific manner; as the own author agrees in his work on the topic, declaring that his study on human passions would be similar to the one of a physician. As this “Treatise of passions” is his last work, it is in itself some sort of conclusion of the big cartesian thesis. For example, by proposing to make a scientific research of the passions we suppose the method he relies in for his investigation is the Discussion, which the author himself assures in his Introduction gave him such good results that he decides to publish it for whomever is interested in the knowledge of nature. The ouvre in question is an Introduction to: The Dioptric, the Metheors and Geometry. Equally, the Treatise of passions suggests a substantial dualism from the Meditations and the mechanics as an explicative hypothesis of the most accepted natural philosophy in his times.

Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31553 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Leonel Toledo Marín renrivse@hotmail.com

In the following lines, I will explore some Cartesian tenets (mainly derived from the first three Metaphysical meditations) that may suggest or may lead to some form of solipsism. In particular, I will pay special attention to both the dream argument and Descartes’ Devil genius, in order to evaluate how “solipsistic” these arguments are. Besides, I will examine the Cartesian conception of res cogitans, as a substance capable of existing by itself (alone).

Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31555 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Alejandra Velázquez renrivse@hotmail.com

In this paper, I follow in a critical manner some of the arguments of Berkeley taken from (An essay towards a New Theory of Vision, 1709), mostly centered against the Cartesian optic-geometry (La Dioptrique in Discours de la méthode and Essays, 1637); in particular all those referred to the visual perception in distance. This strategy of analysis will put in clear that these two philosophers, both made a research the visual phenomena from different perspectives, that is the reason why neither of these theories can be considered as non valid or replaced by another, at the contrary, we need to understand each theory and value his significance nowadays in their own context and his own terms. Descartes in his “Dioptrique” leads his research to the physical exploration of the light movement, also as the exposition of the physiological and anatomical of the mechanics of vision; meanwhile Berkeley by his way opens the new investigation of Psychology of vision, through this, he gave a new solution to understand the problem of the nature of the vision, within the frame of his inmaterialistic philosophy. This is the reason why Berkeley considered the need to denounce the fails of Descartes in his geometric optics. We will see how this denounce is according with the philosophical terms of Descartes or not.

Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31534 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Carlos Oliva Mendoza renrivse@hotmail.com Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31558 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Carlos F. López Ocampo renrivse@hotmail.com Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31562 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Carlos Ham Juárez renrivse@hotmail.com Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31563 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Víctor Hugo Méndez Aguirre renrivse@hotmail.com Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31564 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Lizbeth Sagols renrivse@hotmail.com Copyright (c) https://journals.unam.mx/index.php/afil/article/view/31567 2012-04-26T14:32:23-05:00 Ricardo Alcocer Urueta renrivse@hotmail.com Cristina Pérez Díaz renrivse@hotmail.com Copyright (c)